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Summary:
Increasing attention is being paid to the concept of strategic
groups in the field of strategic management. Extant studies have
attempted to identify and describe strategic groups in different
industries by using production or marketing variables or measures of
investor behavior. In this study, accounting measures of financial
strategies were used as a proxy for strategic behavior in examining
group composition in the office equipment/electronic computing
industry. These measures were analyzed using the technique of
Three Mode Factor Analysis. Results obtained significantly expand
current understanding of strategic group membership.

Strategic Groups: A Three Mode Factor Analysis of
Some Ileasures of Financial Risk
Increasing attention is being paid to the concept of strategic
groups in the field of strategic management. Extant studies have
attempted to identify and describe strategic groups in different
industries by using production or marketing variables or measures of
investor behavior. In this study, accounting measures of the riskiness
of financial strategies were used as a proxy for strategic behavior
as a basis for examining group composition in the office equipment/
electronic computing industry. These measures were used in conjunction
with the analytic tool of Three-tlode-Factor Analysis to develop an
understanding of strategic groups in the computing industry.
The idea of strategic groups was initially proposed by Hunt (1972)
to explain the existence of four different, distinctive, successful
strategies followed by members of the home appliance industry. Since
then, this concept of strategic groups has served industrial economists
as a convenient intervening construct between the firm and the industry
which can help explain the structure-conduct-performance linkage (McGee,
1982). The initial conceptualization of strategic groups by Hunt focused
on particular product-market segments and similarity of competitor beha-
vior in regards to their strategic actions. However, further researchers
in the area have used somewhat different definitions of strategic groups.
Newman (1975) identified them by the relationship between the companies'
actions in a particular industry and participation in other industries,
resulting in forming groups based primarily on vertical integration
criteria. Porter's (1979) operational definition of strategic groups
involved measures of market share as a basis for grouping companies into
"leader" and "follower" classes. His research focused on primarily pro-
duction and marketing measures to test differences in behavior between
these two groups in several consumer goods industries. However, all
of these studies have concentrated primarily on two functional areas
—
production and marketing— to study the conduct of strategic group members.
Several researchers (Hatten, Schendel and Cooper, 1978; Primeaux,
1982; Ryans and Wittink, 1982) have been interested in the importance
of financial strategy to group formation and performance. While studying
the brewing industry, Hatten, Schendel and Cooper (1978) included two
financial variables in addition to their manufacturing and marketing
variables. They used the Total Debt/Invested Capital ratio as a measure
of leverage and a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of
merger and acquisition behavior in their regression equation models to
test for differences between three groups identified from a previous
intensive industry analysis. They found that regional and semiregional
brewers benefited from the increased use of leverage, but adequate con-
clusions could not be drawn about the national or small regional brewers.
The merger and acquisition variable was significant for the industry
equation but not for any of the group equations. They suggest that the
lack of significant relationships between merger and performance in any
groups may have been due to the failure to study a lagged effect of this
variable.
Primeaux (1982) is also studying a financial variable which might
be used in forming strategic groups. He hypothesized that investment
behavior as measured by net capital expenditures may be an important
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variable which can be used to identify the industry life cycle stage a
company is in. Strategic groups can then be characterized by their
life cycle stage. Priraeaux is pursuing a study of how possible groups
may vary on these measures.
Ryans and Wittink (1982), using a security market measure of risk
taking, namely residuals of a market model of security returns, were
able to form strategic groups in the airline industry, during the period
deregulation of that industry went into effect. Their work suggests
that the risk involved in financial strategies might be an important
variable on which strategic groups would vary, but their measure of risk
is a market determined, investor oriented one, rather than one which
more closely mirrors managerial behavior. Therefore, it was decided to
use accounting measures of risk, which have been shown by Beaver,
Kettler and Scholes (1970) and Bildersee (1975) to be associated with
market models of risk, in this study. These accounting measures of risk
may be used by investors in making stock purchase decisions, but perhaps
represent managerial decision more closely because one intervening
construct in the chain has been removed. Figure 1 provides a simple
conceptualization of the link of the two types of measures of financial
risk, accounting measures and market measures, and management and inves-
tor strategies. The accounting measures are seen to more closely
reflect managerial strategies involving such decisions as dividend
policy, the amount of debt a company can or should bear, etc. There-
fore, the strategic groups formed will be based more on management
behavior than investor behavior.
Insert Figure 1 About Here
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It was necessary, in order to study the grouping of companies on
financial risk variables, to find an industry with particular charac-
teristics. First, the industry should be subject to at least a moderate
amount of environmental complexity and dynamism. This would enable an
examination of an interesting problem, where the respective managements
would have to formulate and implement strategies to compete in a common
environment. However, the environment would pose uncertainties for mana-
gers which would test their willingness and ability to manage financial
risk in strategy formulation. The second criterion involved finding an industry
wherein the majority of the firms were not widely diversified. This was
a practical requirement in that widely diversified firms with several
SBU' s/divisions in various industries could not demonstrate differences
in within-industry financial strategy particularly since financial
measures of individual division performance were not easily obtainable.
The office equipment/electronic computing industry met these
requirements and was chosen. A five year time period, 1977-1981, was
also selected. This period was characterized by technological, compe-
titive and economic dynamism as well as the inclusion of some new com-
petitors for whom financial data was available for five but not ten
years.
Between 1977-81 the industry had faced three major trends or changes.
First, the rise in the importance of mini and micro processors due to
developments in chip technology had changed the complexion of business
data processing and opened up the field of personal computing, encourag-
ing new entrants into the industry. Second, the way had been paved by
Amdahl for the development of plug compatible equipment. Manufacturers
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vere able to produce components which could be used in conjunction with
a mainframe computer of any make (usually IBM). This allowed these
companies to forge ahead in limited areas of technology without being
concerned with problems of designing and making central processing units
and again encouraged many firms to enter the industry. A third trend
in the industry dealt with the increasing sophistication and avail-
ability of software. While the equipment portion of the industry became
increasingly standardized and mature particularly in the mainframe seg-
ment, software development continued to increase in importance and
breadth of application on a wide variety of equipment types.
These industry characteristics suggested the possibility that
within the office equipment/electronic computing industry, a variety of
strategies characterized by different risk levels could be identified.
Therefore, an attempt was made to classify industry firms into strategic
groups based on measures of financial risk taking.
Methodology
The sample consisted of all firms in the office equipment/electronic
computing industry (SIC 357x) for whom financial data were available on
Compustat tapes. Of the 55 companies (Table 1) who were listed as in
Insert Table 1 About Here
the industry, data were available for the five year period, 1977-1981,
on 46 companies. Therefore, analysis proceeded on this sample. The
nine companies which were deleted typically were new entrants for
whom information covering the entire time period was not available.
Therefore, if the sample is biased, it is toward the older and probably
somewhat more risk averse firms. However, 13 of the 46 companies used
were 10 years older or less, so new firms composed about one-third of
the sample.
The accounting risk measures selected for use were: current ratio,
debt to equity ratio, return on assets, dividend payout ratio, times
interest earned and size. The current ratio (CR) is a measure of a
company's ability to cover its short term liabilities through use of
its current assets. A 1:1 current ratio or less is seen as rather
risky, because the firm is not generating enough cash to cover its
current obligations, however, too high a CR may indicate poor cash
management. Debt to equity ratio (D/E) was chosen as a leverage mea-
sure. In times of high interest rates, a high D/E ratio may indicate
excessive use of debt financing which may impose heavy interest charges
on the firm. It may reduce profits which will be a risky course of
action in the stockholders' and managers' eyes and cause high debt
charges, a risky action in debt holders' view. Return on assets (ROA)
was chosen as a profitability measure simply based on the idea that a
profitable firm is seen as having more flexibility to pursue any course
of action since it has the funds to finance the innovation and a cushion
of investor confidence which can be relied on if more funds are needed.
Dividend payout (DP) was included as a common measure of financial risk,
involving the percentage of earnings paid out in dividends. A high DP
ratio may indicate the company is not retaining enough earnings to
finance its growth or is perhaps continuing a fixed level dividend
regardless of earnings, both risky courses of action. However, it may
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also be associated with reluctance to use debt financing and the costs
of relying on equity capital. The fifth ratio calculated was times
interest earned (TIE). Poor interest coverage would indicate a risk
taking firm. A size measure, logarithm of total assets, was also
included based on the idea that larger companies are often older and
less prone to take risks.
The financial ratios chosen were calculated using the X-Ratio sub-
file associated with the Corapustat system. Documentation of ratio
calculation formulas used by the program is available from the authors.
Since it was felt that strategic groups would exhibit moderate sta-
bility over time, it was necessary to select an analytic technique which
would allow simultaneous study of companies, financial variables and
time. Therefore, Three-Mode Factor Analysis (Tucker, 1966) was used to
give a picture of strategic groups consisting of firms which exhibit
similar financial behavior in the relevant time period.
The data were standardized and the analysis performed using the
VII. TM1 program available on SOUPAC at the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign. This program yields a factor analytic solution to a
three dimensional i by j by k data matrix. In this analysis, i repre-
sents companies, j represents the risk variables and k represents the
five years. The input data matrix consisted of standardized scores in
the two dimensional form .K where row entries, i, represent company
data and column entries represent combinations of modes j and k with
the time mode, k, nested within the ratio mode, j. Through factoring,
it is possible to reduce the observational modes (i, j, k) to a set of
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derivational modes (in, p, q) . The fundamental three-mode factor analy-
sis model can be stated by the equation:
x
. .
,
= E E E a . b . c, gij k lm j p kq aipq
where:
x. ., = an aporoximation of the observed score x...ijk r * ljk
a. ,b. , c = entries in the two mode matrices, iA^, jBp, and ^Cq which
describe elements in the observational mode in terms of
elements in the derivational mode.
a = entries in the three dimensional core matrix G.
°rapq
In matrix form the model would be stated:
X.
.,
= .A G, A B.X C. )ljk l m (pq) p j q k
where:
X = Kronecker product.
.A
,
B. , C, = factor solutions for modes i, i, and k.
l ra p j q k
G = core matrix of the derivational modes.
X = matrix representing the observational modes.
Output of Part one of the analysis yields the cross products
matrices, eigenvalues and eigenvectors of each mode, as well as the
core matrix of the unrotated factor solution. The number of components
retained for each mode in the final solution were determined using scree
tests, as suggested by Tucker (1966). Such tests (Figures 2a, 2b, and
2c) show that six factors need to be retained in the i mode, and three
Insert Figure 2 About Here
in each of the other modes. These factors were rotated using a Varimax
rotation and then submitted to Part two of the program. Input to Part
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two consists of the unrotated core matrix from Part one and the trans-
formation matrices from the modes which were rotated. Output from Part
two is the transformed core matrix, which indicates the simultaneous
relationships among the three modes.
Results
Risk Variables
Loadings after Varimax rotation indicated close to simple structure
had been achieved for this mode. Loadings on the respective factors
are shown in Table 2. Although labeling is tenuous, illustrative
Insert Table 2 About Here
factor names were applied to provide greater interpretability in the
core matrix and better suggest applicability of three-mode analysis.
The first variables factor is comprised of just the dividend payout
variable which may be summarized as an investor/market directed factor.
The second factor, on the other hand, seems to represent variables which
suggest sophistication of liquidity management. Sophistication in cash
management, as seen by loadings on this factor, seem to be directly
related to size. It appears that larger firms had better cash manage-
ment techniques which allowed them to keep their current ratios low.
Smaller firms with rapid growth, sudden inflows of cash, and perhaps
some difficulty getting short term financing had higher current ratios.
Thus, this factor may be more a measure of management sophistication
and size than risk taking.
The three variables showing up on Factor 3 represent a company's
ability to generate earnings to cover its debt payments. Although many
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of the older companies had probably found long term debt a rather cheap
form of capital in earlier periods, with rising interest rates, new
companies as well as older companies desirous of going to the debt
markets found this an expensive source of funds. Those firms which had
to rely on new debt financing probably suffered a decline in ROA due to
high interest charges and a subsequent decline in the times interest
earned figure. Thus, this factor provides a set of variables which may
clearly distinguish between strategic groups in regards to their source
of financing and its effects on returns. Alternatively, it may distin-
guish firms willing to sacrifice current ROA in hopes of growth generated
through debt financing which may improve long run ROA prospects.
Time Mode
In the time mode, again simple structure was achieved. 1977 and
1978 loaded separately on two factors. However, 1979-1981 loaded on a
third factor. (See Table 2). During 1977 and 1978 the move toward
mini and micro computers and plug compatible equipment was gaining
momentum, while economic problems in the form of high interest rates
were characteristic of the 1979-81 period.
Company Mode
The six factors retained in the company mode accounted for 82.5% of
the variance, but six companies did not load heavily on any one factor.
Companies which loaded similarly on a particular factor are considered
a strategic group, in keeping with Tucker (1966) who suggests that the
factors which emerge from the subject or company (i) mode may be inter-
preted as representing an ideal type for objects which load heavily on
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that factor. Factors 1, 2, and 3 had only one company load on them
(see Table 3), indicating these companies pursued somewhat unique
Insert Table 3 About Here
financial strategies. Applied Devices (Group 1) was characterized by
an initial position in 1977 of high current ratio and low size, with an
average dividend payout ratio and average debt/equity and return. In
1978, its debt/equity rose sharply while ROA declined as did the current
ratio, with DP remaining stable. During 1979-81, its DP declined to a
relatively low position while D/E remained very high, ROA was depressed
and CR was about average. Applied Devices' financial structure became
much riskier over the five year period studied. This pattern is derived
from examination of the rotated core matrix, which is found in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 About Here
Pioneer Texas was the only company to enter Group 2, but its pattern
is somewhat similar to Applied Devices'. In 1977 their positions were
roughly equivalent. However, in 1978, Pioneer's debt/equity ratio rose
to an extremely high level while ROA declined to negative levels. DP
was cut sharply. In the next three years, Pioneer managed to reduce D/E
significantly while increasing ROA slightly and resuming an average level
of dividend payout.
Electronic Associates (Group 3) showed a huge dividend payout during
1977 with a miniscule ROA (.0007). ROA increased somewhat over the next
four years and the dividend payout percentage was reduced accordingly.
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During the whole period, Electronic Associates' current ratio was main-
tained at high levels, while D/E was about average. Electronic Asso-
ciates evidently adopted the rather risky position of maintaining an
even dividend payout regardless of the level of earnings.
In contrast to the rather unique, risky, financial strategies
followed by the previous three firms, the companies which load heavily
on Factor 4 are much more conservative. During 1977 and 1978 they main-
tained a low DP policy, and evidenced steady growth in asset size,
probably financed from internally generated or equity funding as their
D/E position remained very low and ROA very high. However, during 1979-
81, their ROA declined somewhat and D/E increased, although they remained
close to industry averages. Members of this group pursued a very risk-
averse course of financial strategy which appeared to be quite success-
ful.
On Factor 5, there were two groups of companies which loaded
heavily—some positively and some negatively. The firms in the posi-
tive loading group (Group 5+) were generally small companies with high
current ratios and average DP over the five year period. However, while
their D/E was initially high and ROA low, they steadily improved their
D/E position until it was better than the industry average, while ROA
increased similarly. It may be suggested that these companies used debt
financing to get started
—
perhaps a necessary risk to finance future
growth—and were able to adopt a less risky course of action as their
earnings allowed.
The group of firms which loaded negatively on Factor 5 (Group 5-)
were in a strategically interesting but perhaps less favorable position.
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Many of the old giants of the various industry segments are found in
this group, as indicated by their low CR/high size position over the
five year period. Their dividend payout remained fairly constant while
their debt/equity ratio increased steadily. ROA and times interest
earned declined. Due to lack of technological innovation, perhaps, and
the inability or lack of desire to retain funds to try to attain break-
throughs in technology, these companies relied more heavily on expensive
debt during the 1979-81 period, which further depressed ROA and ability
to maintain production, R&D, and marketing leadership in their fields.
They might be characterized as companies forced into risky financial
strategies because of their unwillingness to take R&D risks.
For Factor 6, again two groups were identified. Those companies
which loaded positively on Factor 6 (Group 6+) were characterized by
average to low dividend payout and very low debt/equity ratios over the
complete five year period. However, during this period, their size
increased steadily while CR fell. This might be described as the con-
servative growth group. They were able to use equity and retained ear-
nings to generate excellent returns and significant growth.
The companies which loaded negatively on Factor 6 (Group 6-) showed
a great deal of movement in their financial ratios. For many of the
companies the movement was in the wrong direction. Beginning in 1977,
the firms had very high D/E ratios with low ROA which was maintained
through 1981. However, throughout the period, they also maintained a
relatively high dividend payout. Interestingly, their current ratio
rose steadily while size decreased relative to other firms, indicating
perhaps that these firms grew more slowly than their competitors, due
in part to the financial strategies followed.
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Discussion
This study has demonstrated that it is possible to identify several
rather stable groups in the office equipment/electronic computing
industry which differ in terms of their financial policies. In the
past, Caves and Porter (1977) have been most concerned with the ability
of strategic groups to formulate a common strategy which can be defended
against imitators by the erection of mobility barriers. However, if
companies are grouped based on the riskiness of their financial policies,
mobility barriers will be of less concern and effectiveness a more impor-
tant concern. It is not too difficult to vote a large dividend or to
borrow money. What is of interest is the return earned by companies
which pursue the various strategies. In this industry, the highest
returns were earned by those companies pursuing the most conservative
financial policies.
Although the direction of causality in this conservative-return
relationship has not been tested in this study, it may be possible to
see whether mobility barriers do exist which allow firms in conserva-
tive groups to maintain their high profit levels. The older, larger,
more conservative firms associated with Group 4 have been able to
generate the funds necessary for technological risk taking by earning
high returns on early innovations and retaining these funds to finance
further growth without having to rely heavily on debt financing. Thus,
their early product market success coupled with financial conservatism
has placed them in positions which cannot be easily imitated by compe-
titors. Their past strategies have also currently placed them in a
position where they can continue to be financially conservative.
-15-
The companies which were in Group 6+ are also quite conservative,
but smaller firms. It may be that they are in the earlier stages of
successful imitation of the Group 4 strategy. If they have the products
and desire necessary for continued growth, they may be able perhaps to
enter Group 4. In fact, on cluster analysis, most of the new entrants
to Group 4 in 1980 came from the 1977 grouping of smaller, successful,
financially risk-averse firms.
The dilemma of the companies in Group 5- is clear. These are the
large, old firms in their segment of the industry. However, it may be
appropriate to suggest that they have limited their chances of mobility
into other higher return groups by their finanicial policies. By main-
taining relatively high dividend payouts, they may have failed to retain
the funds necessary to generate innovation or to move by acquisition
into more rapidly growing industry segments. Their heavier reliance on
debt financing during the period of the study, also attenuated their
ability to generate growth funds that enable higher ROA in the long run.
Thus, their past financial policies may have constrained their ability
to make significant strategic change at this point even if they imme-
diately try to adopt a different financial course of action.
The companies which fall into other strategic groups are fairly
small and are perhaps still more concerned with developing a distinc-
tive product, and surviving to be concerned with financial policy.
However, results of this paper may indicate for them a good course to
pursue, once survival is assured. The dichotomous nature of this
industry, where financial conservatism is needed in conjunction with
technological risk taking is fascinating. However, it is probable that
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in sone iadustries, financial risk, taking is critical for success.
Thus, it is necessary to extend this analysis to other industries to
determine if similar strategic groups can be identified in different
contexts. It may also be beneficial to apply this type of analysis to
firms of different ages in different industries to assess the importance
of industry-life cycle interactions. However, for the field of strate-
gic management, it may be important to expand the concept of strategic
groups to include financial and risk, taking characteristics of the groups,
-17-
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Table 1
Companies in the Office Equipment/Electronic Computing Industry-
Listed on Corapustat
1 Burroughs Corp.
2 Hunt Mfg.
3 Intl Business Machines Corp.
4 Litton Industries Inc.
5 MSI Data Corp.
6 Mangood Corp.
7 NCR Corp.
3 Pitney-Bowes Inc.
9 Rockaway Corp.
10 Amdahl Corp.
11 Applied Devices
12 Applied Magnetics Corp.
13 Barry Wright Corp.
14 Beehive International
15 Centronics Data Computer
16 Commodore Intl Ltd.
17 Computer Consoles
18 Control Data Corp.
19 Cray Research
20 Data Access Systems, Inc.
21 Data General Corp.
22 Data Terminal Systems Inc.
23 Datapoint Corp.
24 Dataproducts Corp.
25 Digital Equipment
26 Electronic Associates Inc.
27 Electronic Memories & Magnet
28 Genisco Technology
29 Hazettine Corp.
30 Hewlett-Packard Co.
31 Honeywell Inc.
32 Lanier Business Products Inc.
33 Lundy Electronics & Systems
34 Management Assistance
35 Modular Computer Systems
36 Mohawk Data Sciences
37 Pioneer Texas Corp.
38 Prime Computer
39 Recognition Equipment Inc.
40 Reynolds & Reynolds
41 Sperry Corp.
42 Storage Technology Corp.
43 TEC Inc.
44 Telex
45 Vermont Research Inc.
46 Wang Laboratories
47 Anderson Jacobson, Inc.
48 Computervision Corp.
49 Floating Point Systems Inc.
50 Intertec Data Systems Corp.
51 NBI Inc.
52 Rolm Corp.
53 Ultimate Corp.
54 Verbatim Corp.
55 Wesper Corp.
Companies with missing values excluded from the sample.
Table 2
Matrices for the Variable and Time Modes
Financial Strategy Variables
CR
ROA
D/E
DP
TIE
Size
Investor Liquidity
treatment management Debt
orientation sophistication aversion
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
-.083 .618* .231
-.036 .028 .640
-.234 .112 -.576*
.935* .041 .021
-.230 .138 .406*
-.094 -.764*
.200
Time Mode
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Economic Microprocessor/
downturn PCM entry
Factor 1 Factor 2
.008 .999*
.018 -.000
.418* .026
.694* -.031
.586* .004
Microprocessor/
PCM growth
Factor 3
-.000
.986*
.088
.037
-.137
*Variables included on that factor.
Table 3
Strategic Groups in the Office Equipment/Electronic Computing Industry
1977-1981
Group 1
Applied Devices
Group 2
Pioneer Texas
Group 3
Electronic
Associates
Group 4
IBM
MSI
Amdahl
Barry Wright
Centronics
Data General
Data Terminals
Hewlett-Packard
Group 5+
Hunt Mfg.
Mangood
Rockaway
Computer Consoles
Data Access
Modular Computer
Systems
TEC Inc.
Vermont Research
Group 5-
Burroughs
Litton
NCR
Pitney Bowes
Control Data
Honeywell
Sperry Corp.
Group 6+
Cray Research
Digital Equipment
Corporation
Dataproducts
Electronic Memories
Prime Computer
Reynolds & Reynolds
Group 6-
Mangood
Genisco
Applied Magnetics
Beehive
Commodore Int'l.
Lundy Electronics
and Svstems
Storage Technology Wang Laboratories
Table 4
Transformed Core Matrix
Core Matrix for Company Mode, Factor 1
1977 1978 1979
DP .603 .216 -1.187
CR/Size 1.823 .182 .521
D/E, ROA, TIE -10.292 -.133 -1.931
Core Matrix for Company Mode, Factor 2
1977 1978 1979
DP -.191 -1.725 .608
CR/Size 1.090 .697 .104
D/E, ROA, TIE .014 -10.824 -.301
Core Matrix for Company Mode, Factor 3
1977 1978 1979
DP 14.253 .150 .521
CR/Size 1.283 .647 1.174
D/E, ROA, TIE -.646 -.111 .066
Core Matrix for Company Mode, Factor 4
1977 1978 1979
DP -2.444 -1.500 -1.04
CR/Size .168 .958 -1.975
D/E, ROA, TIE 6.935 5.388 -.406
Core Matrix for Company Mode, Factor 5
1977 1978 1979
DP -.027 .523 .039
CR/Size 7.685 5.298 10.037
D/E, ROA, TIE -.203 .193 1.346
Core Matrix for Company Mode, Factor 6
1977 1978 1979
DP -1.205 -.542 -.521
DR/Size 4.477 -.453 -2.286
D/E, ROA, TIE 5.411 3.657 5.065
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